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Crafting Employment Policy During EU
Accession: Strategies for Romania and
Bulgaria
Tomas Felcman"
INTRODUCTION
Prior to the early 1990s, employment law and policy within
the European Community (EC)' had traditionally been the pre-
rogative of individual Member States.2 Since then, a number of
interdependent developments have necessitated a rearrange-
ment from soft coordination towards closer alignment of
national employment policymaking and concomitantly, greater
involvement of European institutions.3 Following the initial
* J.D., 2005, University of Minnesota Law School. I am indebted to Meghan Anzelc
and Joe Devlin for helpful comments and assistance with earlier drafts of this
article. A special thanks goes to my father, Mr. Jaromir Felcman, whose support
made this article possible.
1. The European Union proper was established by the Treaty on European
Union, signed in Maastricht in 1992. Treaty on European Union, Jul. 29, 1992, 1992
O.J. (C 191) 1, available at http://europa.eu.inteur-lex/en/treaties/dat/11992M/htm/
11992M.html [hereinafter EU Treaty]. For the sake of simplicity, I will use the
terms "European Union" and "European Community" interchangeably throughout
the article.
2. Until the signing of the EU Treaty, intergovernmental cooperation within
the EC had been limited to little more than a customs union-i.e., an economic
alliance based upon freedom of movement of goods, services, capital, and people. See
Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community, Mar. 25,
1957, 2002 O.J. (C 325) 33, available at http://europa.eu.int/eur-
lex/lex/en/treaties/dat/12002E/pdf/12002EEN.pdf [hereinafter EC Treaty]. Until
1992, the integration of Europe thus lacked both the legislative and institutional
framework to cope with themes such as employment and social policy at the
supranational level. See id. On the progression of European integration, see
generally JOHN GILLINGHAM, EUROPEAN INTEGRATION, 1950-2003: SUPERSTATE OR
NEW MARKET ECONOMY? (2003).
3. The primary impulse for this shift has been the closer integration of
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impetus provided by the influential Delors' White Book on
Growth, Competitiveness and Employment4 in 1993, the prog-
ress toward deeper concord culminated in the second half of the
1990s with the ratification of the Treaty of Amsterdam5 and the
subsequent adoption of the European Employment Strategy
(EES).' These two developments mark a paradigmatic shift in
macroeconomic policies following the 1992 signing of the EU Treaty. See EU Treaty,
supra note 1. Additionally, since the early 1990s, there has been a growing
awareness among European governments of the spillover effects of national-level
employment regulation. The recognition of the interdependence of national
employment policymaking with other areas of "common concern"-economic, social,
or political-is reflected in a variety of recently passed EU instruments. See, e.g.,
Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties
Establishing the European Communities and Certain Related Acts, art. 2(19), Oct.
2, 1997, 1997 O.J. (C 340) 1, available at http://www.europarl.eu.int/topics/treaty/
pdf/amst-en.pdf [hereinafter Treaty of Amsterdam]. Finally, during this period, EU
institutions have become more attentive to economic research pointing to a strong
relationship between employment policy and the persistent economic problems
facing the Community. See, e.g., ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND
DEVELOPMENT, THE OECD JOBS STUDY: FACTS, ANALYSIS, STRATEGIES (1994)
[hereinafter OECD JOBS STUDY]. The 1994 OECD JOBS STUDY has been
particularly influential in pointing to the link between employment policy and high
unemployment, a phenomenon that European governments have battled since the
1980s. It should be stressed, however, that irrespective of the strong move towards
supranational decision making on employment issues, national prerogatives
continue to permeate deeply employment policy within European Union. See infra
note 21. See also infra note 36 and accompanying text.
4. Commission White Paper on Growth, Competitiveness, and Employment:
The Challenges and Ways Forward into the 21st Century, COM (93) 700 final (Dec. 2,
1993), available at http://europa.eu.int/en/record/white/c93700/contents.html. The
White Book, among other things, set forth the theoretical baseline for the creation of
a coordinated approach towards employment issues at the EU level. See id.
5. See Treaty of Amsterdam, supra note 3. See generally European
Commission, Directorate-General for Employment, Industrial Relations and Social
Affairs, Employment in Europe 1998, Jobs for People-People for Jobs: Turning
Policy Guidelines into Action, at 3, 11 (1999), available at http://europa.eu.intcomm/
employment-social/employment analysis/eie/1998_en.pdf ("Times have changed
with the... Treaty [of Amsterdam]. The Union now treats employment, not just as
a Member State responsibility, but as a 'matter of common concern.'"). The Treaty
entered into force on May 1, 1999. For a more detailed discussion of the Amsterdam
Treaty, see also infra Part I(A).
6. Sourced in Article 125 of the Treaty of Amsterdam, supra note 3, the EES
centers on priority themes under the four pillars of employability, entrepreneurship,
adaptability, and equal opportunities. See Presidency Conclusions, Extraordinary
Council Meeting on Employment, Luxembourg, 20 and 21 November 1997 (Nov. 24,
1997), available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/employment-social/elm/summiten/
papers/concl.htm. The EES, among other things, calls on Member States annually
to formulate National Action Plans on Employment (NAPs) that incorporate these
priority themes, which are subsequently used by EU institutions for reprioritizing
and making recommendations to Member States with respect to their employment
policies. See id. In 2003, the EES was refined in order to bring about the goals of
the 2000 Lisbon Strategy-most importantly, full employment. The new priorities
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the way the European Union approaches employment issues
and provide broad legal and institutional bases to bolster the
EU's influence on policymaking at the national level.7
Instruments dictating the European Union's influence on
and involvement in national employment regulation have
become vital components of the modern acquis communautaire,
the body of common rights and obligations that binds all
Member States.8 As a result, the implementation of EU employ-
ment acquis became a prerequisite for the satisfaction of the
Copenhagen criteria,9 a set of three focal principles that an EU-
acceding country must satisfy before entering the Union.' ° Since
are: (1) the reduction of the unemployment rate, (2) the encouragement of labor
market participation by women and the retired, (3) the promotion of
entrepreneurship and lifelong learning, and (4) the fight against undeclared work.
See Council Decision 2003/578/EC of 22 July 2003 on Guidelines for the Employment
Policies of the Member States, 1997 O.J. (L 197) 13, available at
http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2003/l_197/1_19720030805en00130021.pdf.
7. See, e.g., Treaty of Amsterdam, supra note 3, art. 130 (creating the Council
Employment Committee designed to "promote coordination between Member States
on employment and labour market policies").
8. These instruments are sourced primarily in the provisions of the
Amsterdam Treaty and channeled through the EES. See infra Part I.
9. Presidency Conclusions, European Council in Copenhagen (June 21-22,
1993), at 13, available at http://ue.eu.intlueDocs/cms-Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/
72921.pdf [hereinafter Copenhagen criteria]. Although the EU expressly reserved its
discretion to decide whether or not to accept a particular acceding country, the 1993
Copenhagen European Council set forth three broad criteria the fulfillment of which
was held to be a sine qua non for accession into the Union. These include: (1)
political requirements-aspiring members have to possess "stability of institutions
guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and
protection of minorities;" (2) economic requirements-acceding countries have to
have a "functioning market economy;" and (3) incorporation of the acquis
communautaire-candidates have to adhere "to the aims of political, economic and
monetary union." Id. The 1995 Madrid European Council, while recognizing the
Copenhagen criteria, further focused on the adaptation of the applicant countries'
institutional structures to create proper conditions for harmonious integration into
the EU. See Presidency Conclusions, Madrid European Council (Dec. 15-16, 1995),
available at http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference =DOC/95/
9&format=HTML&aged=l&language=EN&guiLanguage=en. As is evident,
national employment law and policy touches all three of the Copenhagen criteria.
On the basics of EU enlargement, see also generally Heather Grabbe, The
Implications of EU Enlargement, in DEVELOPMENTS IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN
EUROPEAN POLITICS 3 (Stephan White et al. eds., 3d ed. 2003), available at
http://www.cer.org.uk/pdf/grabbe-CEE-oct02.pdf; Hanns-D. Jacobsen, The European
Union's Eastward Enlargement, in 1 EUROPEAN INTEGRATION ONLINE PAPERS
(1997), http://eiop.or.at/eiop/pdf/1997-014.pdf; Dimitry Kochenov, EU Enlargement
Law: History and Recent Developments: Treaty-Custom Concubinage?, in 9
EUROPEAN INTEGRATION ONLINE PAPERS (2005), http://eiop.or.at/eiop/pdf/2005-
006.pdf.
10. On enlargement readiness of both acceding countries and the EU itself, see
20061
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1998, the objective of the European Commission1' has been to
oversee that the twelve countries acceding to the EU,12 ten of
which became Member States on May 1, 2004,'" bring their
legislation into alignment with the EU employment acquis and
progressively adjust their institutional frameworks in order to
prepare themselves for EU membership.
14
The compulsory implementation of EU employment law into
domestic legislation is certain to put a burden on acceding
countries' public and private sectors, as the new legal and insti-
tutional framework demands structural readjustment of both
government and firm behavior. 5  This is particularly true in
generally Katinka Barysch & Heather Grabbe, Who's Ready for EU Enlargement
(Centre for European Reform, Working Paper No. 416, 2002), available at
http://www.cer.org.uk/pdf/wp416-enlargement.pdf; Jacobsen, supra note 9. See also
infra note 91.
11. Within the EU institutional framework, the European Commission, along
with the European Council, is-with an array of dissimilarities-roughly the
equivalent of the U.S. executive branch. See EU Treaty, supra note 1, arts. C, E,
G(61).
12. On March 31, 1998, accession negotiations were commenced with six
applicant countries-Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, and
Slovenia. On October 13, 1999, the Commission recommended opening negotiations
with Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Romania, and the Slovak Republic. In
addition, on October 6, 2004, the Commission recommended the opening of accession
negotiations with Turkey. See Communication from the Commission to the Council
and the European Parliament-Recommendation of the European Commission on
Turkey's Progress Towards Accession, COM (2004) 656 final (Oct. 6, 2004), available
at http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report_2004/pdfY
tr_recommendation_en.pdf; see also EU Commission Backs Turkey Talks, CABLE
NEWS NETWORK, Oct. 6, 2004, http://www.cnn.com/2004AWORLD/europe/10/06/
eu.turkey.talks/.
13. Treaty Concerning the Accession of the Czech Republic, the Republic of
Estonia, the Republic of Cyprus, the Republic of Latvia, the Republic of Lithuania,
the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Malta, the Republic of Poland, the Republic
of Slovenia and the Slovak Republic to the European Union art. 1, subdiv. 2, Apr. 16,
2003, 2003 O.J. (L 236) 17, available at http:/europa.eu.intleurlex/pri/en/oj/dat/
2003/1_236/1_23620030923en00170032.pdf. The Presidential Conclusions of the
2003 Thessaloniki European Council confirmed that "the objective is to welcome
Bulgaria and Romania as [EU] members in 2007." Presidency Conclusions,
Thessaloniki European Council (June 19-20, 2003), para. 37, available at
http://europa.eu.int/futurum/documents/other/oth200603-en.pdf; see also infra note
174.
14. Specifically, the acquis dealing with employment and social policy
constitutes Chapter 13 in the negotiations with countries aspiring for EU
membership. See European Commission, Enlargement of the European Union:
Guide to Negotiations-Chapter by Chapter (Dec. 2004), available at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/negotiations/chapters/negotiationsguide.pdf;
see also infra note 91.
15. Many analysts have criticized the new administrative, financial, and legal
constraints as anticompetitive and protectionist. Among other things, the critics
[Vol. 15:1
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Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries, which were
recently forced to undergo a profound transformation from cen-
trally planned economies to the free market.6 It is therefore
desirable, from both the perspective of the European Union and
that of the acceding countries, to pay close attention to the
tradeoffs-political, economic, and social-that are being made
during this process. Apart from other palpable benefits, crafting
a proper labor market framework prior to accession has signi-
ficant advantages to doing so ex post facto, in that it allows an
acceding country to fully exploit, upon accession, its economy's
comparative advantages." Furthermore, ex ante activation of a
viable and flexible labor market policy is likely to contribute to
the creation of goodwill that will undoubtedly assist the country
in attracting Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). s Strong FDI
inflow is an element that is highly desirable for acceding coun-
tries because it introduces employment opportunities and new
know-how into their economies." As such, it is subject to fierce
allege that the constraints cause increased labor costs, increased startup costs for
small- and medium-sized businesses, and decreased labor market flexibility. See,
e.g., Marian L. Tupy, EU Enlargement: Costs, Benefits, and Strategies for Central
and Eastern European Countries, POL'Y ANALYSIS, Sept. 18, 2003, at 1, available at
http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa489.pdf. See generally Roger H. Gordon & David D.
Li, Taxes and Government Incentives: Eastern Europe vs. China 1-2 (William
Davidson Inst., Working Paper No. 56, 1997), available at
http://www.bus.umich.edu/KresgeLibrary/Collections/WorkingPapers/wdi/wp56.pdf.
16. See, e.g., G~rard Roland & Thierry Verdier, Transition and the Output Fall
1-3 (William Davidson Inst., Working Paper No. 37, 1997), available at
http://www.bus.umich.edu/KresgeLibrary/Collections/WorkingPapers/wdi/wp37.pdf
(analyzing transition output fall that took place in CEE economies in the early 1990s
and its relationship to price liberalization); Dan Candea & Rodica M. Candea,
Understanding and Managing Challenges to the Romanian Companies During
Transition (William Davidson Inst., Working Paper No. 196, 1998), available at
http://www.bus.umich.edu/KresgeLibrary/Collections/WorkingPapers/wdi/wpl96.pdf
(analyzing salient problems on both the macro- and microeconomic level that
Romanian companies face during transition); see also Jan Svejnar, Labor Market
Flexibility in Central and Eastern Europe (William Davidson Inst., Working Paper
No. 496, 2002), available at httpJ/www.bus.umich.edu/KresgeLibrary/Collections/
WorkingPapers/wdi/wp496.pdf (analyzing labor market flexibility and its
relationship to macroeconomic performance).
17. For CEE countries, the most important advantages include low cost of labor
and lack of market saturation. See, e.g., Tupy, supra note 15, at 8.
18. See, e.g., Beata K Smarzynska & Shang-Jin Wei, Corruption and Cross-
Border Investment: Firm-Level Evidence (William Davidson Inst., Working Paper
No. 494, 2002), available at http://www.bus.umich.edu/KresgeLibrary/Collections/
WorkingPapers/wdi/wp494.pdf (finding a positive relationship between lack of
transparency (corruption) and the level of FDI inflows).
19. See, e.g., Sumon Kumar Bhaumik, Saul Estrin & Klaus Meyer,
Determinants of Employment Growth at MNEs: Evidence from Egypt, India, South
Africa and Vietnam 1-4 (William Davidson Inst., Working Paper No. 707, 2004),
2006]
MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT'L LAW
competition, particularly in the CEE region, as countries strive
for economic convergence with Western Europe."
The purpose of this Note is twofold. First, Parts I and II
provide a comprehensive overview of the current EU acquis
dealing with employment issues and analyze whether the
recently amended Romanian and Bulgarian labor codes comply
with its mandates. Second, taking into account the situation in
their respective labor markets, Part III suggests possible strate-
gies for Romania and Bulgaria on how to take advantage of the
fact that the current employment acquis concerns only a limited
set of topics and constitutes, as a general rule, broad minimum-
standard legislation that leaves national policymakers a signi-
ficant amount of flexibility.2' Part III utilizes modern research
on labor market dynamics as well as documented trans-
formation experiences of the eight CEE countries that entered
the European Union in May 2004. The analysis reveals that the
present Romanian and Bulgarian labor codes fail to satisfy
provisions of several applicable EU directives.22 Furthermore,
Romania and Bulgaria can extract multiple lessons from
economic research on transition in fellow CEE countries, such
as strategies to lower unemployment. These 4lessons, if imple-
mented, have the potential to aid the two countries in achieving
the ultimate goal of their economic and political transformation:
convergence with the West. Importantly, many of the relevant
transition economists' insights about labor market dynamics in
available at http://www.bus.umich.edu/KresgeLibrary/Collections/Workingpapers/
wdi/wp707.pdf; Alan A. Bevan & Saul Estrin, The Determinants of Foreign Direct
Investment in Transition Economies 3 (William Davidson Inst., Working Paper No.
342, 2000), available at http//www.bus.umich.edu/KresgeLibrary/Collections/
WorkingPapers/wdi/wp342.pdf ("[Floreign direct investment plays a crucial role, in
terms of fostering accelerated growth, technical innovation and enterprise
restructuring.").
20. See generally Saul Estrin & Giovanni Urga, Convergence in Output in
Transition Economics: Central & Eastern Europe, 1979-1995 (William Davidson
Inst., Working Paper No. 30, 1997), available at http://www.bus.umich.edu/
KresgeLibrary/Collections/WorkingPapers/wdi/wp30.pdf.
21. As is observable from the presentation of applicable EU legislation in Part
I, infra, irrespective of the strong trend towards closer alignment and substantial
involvement of Brussels' institutions, employment policymaking within the EU
remains heavily infused with national interests of individual Member States and
less harmonized than other "matters of common concern" (e.g., economic and
monetary policy). See, e.g., European Commission, Going for Growth, The Economy
of the EU (Directorate General Press and Communication, Sept. 2003), available at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/publicationstbooklets/move/40/en.pdf; see also infra note
36 and accompanying text.
22. See infra discussion accompanying notes 92-129; see also supra note 9 and
accompanying text.
[Vol. 15:1
STRATEGIES FOR ROMANIA AND BULGARIA
the CEE region can be successfully utilized while at the same
time remaining faithful to both the text and purpose of the
applicable EU employment acquis.
I. CURRENT EU EMPLOYMENT ACQUIS
The EU employment acquis encompasses four sets of inter-
related instruments: (1) treaties; (2) secondary legislation, such
as regulations and directives; (3) case law of the European Court
of Justice (ECJ);2 and (4) nonbinding tertiary instruments, such
as Council 24 recommendations and guidelines adopted pursuant
to the Lisbon Strategy25 and the EES.26
A. TREATIES
Treaties, the core legislation of the EU, establish broad
general principles that set the stage for more comprehensive
and detailed secondary legislation. In the context of employ-
ment law, the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam27 is particularly signi-
ficant. Among other things, the treaty amended Article 2 of the
EU Treaty28 and Article 2 of the EC Treaty29 to make achieve-
ment of "a high level of employment" one of the key objectives of
e stitutions. 0 More importantly, however, the treatyEuropean intt os  otaty eer tet
added a new title, Title 8, to the EC Treaty that deals exclu-
sively with employment. Title 8 commands the development of
a "co-ordinated strategy for employment and.., for promoting a
skilled, trained and adaptable workforce and labour markets
23. ECJ case law, even though directly binding on EU Member States, will not
be analyzed in Part I, as decisions of the ECJ are based on interpretation of primary
and secondary instruments and generally concern resolution of narrow technical
issues that are beyond the scope of this article. See EU Treaty, supra note 1, arts.
G(51)-(57).
24. For specifics about The Council of the European Union, see id. arts. C, D, E,
G(61); see also supra note 11.
25. See Presidency Conclusions, Lisbon European Council (Mar. 24, 2000),
available at http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cmsData/docs/pressData/en/ec/00100-
rl.enO.htm; see also infra discussion accompanying note 88.
26. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
27. See Treaty of Amsterdam, supra note 3.
28. See id. The current Article 2 of the EU Treaty corresponds to the former
Article B.
29. See supra note 2.
30. See Treaty of Amsterdam, supra note 3, arts. 1(5), 1(16)(2). As mentioned
above, prior to the ratification of the Amsterdam Treaty, employment law and policy
within the EU had historically been the exclusive domain of national legislatures.
See supra note 2.
2006]
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responsive to economic change."3' The treaty further man-dates
that EU Member States "regard promoting employment as a
matter of common concern."32 In addition, Title 8 allows EU
institutions to draw guidelines and make recommendations to
Member States concerning employment issues,33 gives the
European Council authority to adopt incentive measures and
initiatives,34 and creates an advisory Council Employment
Committee to "promote co-ordination between Member States
on employment and labour market policies."35 Despite the above
developments, deference to national prerogatives respecting
employment law and policy constitutes an important aspect of
the treaty's overall scheme.
B. SECONDARY LEGISLATION
Secondary legislation puts into operation specific provisions
of the foundational EU and EC Treaties and often incorporates
relevant decisions of the ECJ. 37 The adoption of secondary legis-
lative instruments-that is, regulations, decisions, and direc-
tives-involves a delicate interplay among the three pivotal EU
institutions: the European Commission, the Council of
Ministers, and the European Parliament.38
1. Regulations and Decisions
Regulations are self-executing legislative instruments of
general application that directly bind all Member States and
thus do not require implementing legislation at the national
level.39 In the context of employment law, the role of regulations
is minimal due to the politically sensitive nature of employment
regulation, as well as the recognition that the existence of
diverse institutional and legal frameworks across the EU cur-
rently makes uniformly applicable employment legislation
40inappropriate.
31. See EC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 125 (emphasis added).
32. See id. art. 126 (emphasis added).
33. See id. art. 128. While nonbinding, recommendations and guidelines are an
oft-used tool of the EES. See supra note 6.
34. See id. art. 129.
35. See id. art. 130.
36. See, e.g., id. arts. 127, 129.
37. See EU Treaty, supra note 1, art. G(60).
38. See id. See also supra notes 11 and 24.
39. See EU Treaty, supra note 1, art. G(60).
40. See infra notes 43-84 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 15:1
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Conceptually similar to regulations, European Council deci-
sions are directly binding on EU Member States to whom they
are addressed and do not require implementing legislation.4'
For the same reasons as regulations, decisions play a minimal
42
role as regards EU employment acquis.
2. Directives
Directives are non-self-executing legislative instruments
that bind signatories as to the results to be achieved, yet give
national legislatures discretion with respect to the form and
method of implementation. Currently, directives of the
European Council are the primary tool used to regulate employ-
ment in the EU.44 The directives tend to be relatively recent and
focus on a limited number of employment-related issues,
including collective redundancies (layoffs), transfers of under-
takings (changes of employer due to transfer or merger),
employee rights of information, employee protection in cases of
employer insolvency, working conditions, and nondiscrimi-
nation.45
a. Collective redundancies
46Directive 98/59/EC on Collective Redundancies sets forth
procedures that employers must follow when "contemplating col-
lective redundancies."4 7 The Directive commands, among other
41. See EU Treaty, supra note 1, art. G(60).
42. But see, e.g., Council Decision 2000/750 of 27 November 2000 Establishing
Community Action Plan to Combat Discrimination, art. 8(1), 2000 O.J. (L 303) 23-
28, available at http://europa.eu.intlinfonet/library/m/ 2000750ce/en.htm (mandating
coordination of the EU's anti-discrimination program with activities related to
employment).
43. See EU Treaty, supra note 1, art. G(60). Directives operate on the same
principle as non-self-executing treaties in the American legal system. See, e.g.,
Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853;
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, as
last revised July 24, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 1341, 828 U.N.T.S. 221.
44. See infra notes 46-84 and accompanying text.
45. See infra Part I(B)(2)(a)-(f).
46. Council Directive 98/59/EC of 20 July 1998, On the Approximation of the
Laws of the Member States Relating to Collective Redundancies, 1998 O.J. (L 225)
16, available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/employment-social/labourlaw/docs/
directive98_59-en.pdf [hereinafter Directive 98/59/EC].
47. Id. art. 2(1). The term "collective redundancies" refers to "dismissals
effected by an employer for one or more reasons not related to the individual
workers concerned." Id. art. 1(1)(a). The number of employee dismissals has to
exceed certain numerical thresholds established by the Directive. See id.
2006]
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things, written notification to public authorities48 and consul-
tation with employees' representatives about ways to avoid or
reduce the collective redundancies and mitigate the conse-
quences of the redundancies "by recourse to accompanying social
measures.9
b. Transfer of undertakings.
EU law addressing transfers of undertakings 5° aims to
reduce differences among European countries with respect to
their statutory provisions safeguarding employee rights in the
event of a change of employer brought about by legal transfer or
merger.' Among other things, it directs that the transferor-
employer's rights and obligations vis-&-vis its employees be
transferred to the transferee-employer." The directive further
obliges the transferee to "continue to observe ... any collective
agreement on the same terms applicable to the transferor under
that agreement"53 and specifies that the transfer "shall not in
itself constitute grounds for [employee] dismissal."54
c. Rights of information
Directive 2002/14/EC on Information and Consultation of
Employees 5 aims to strengthen the dialogue between manage-
ment and labor and calls on Member States to enact legislation
48. See id. art. 3(1).
49. See id. art. 2(2).
50. Council Directive 2001/23/EC of 12 March 2001, On the Approximation of
the Laws of the Member States Relating to the Safeguarding of Employees' Rights in
the Event of Transfers of Undertakings, Businesses or Parts of Undertakings or
Businesses, 2001 O.J. (L 82) 16, available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/
employment-socialAabourjlaw/docs/directive200l_23-en.pdf [hereinafter Directive
2001/23/EC].
51. See id. pmbl. f 3-4, art. 1(1)(a).
52. See id. art. 3(1). The Directive allows "Member States [to] provide that,
after the date of transfer, the transferor and the transferee shall be jointly and
severally liable in respect of obligations which arose before the date of transfer." Id.
53. See id. art. 3(3). This obligation continues "until the date of termination or
expiry of the collective agreement or the entry into force or application of another
collective agreement." Id.
54. See id. art. 4(1). "This provision shall not stand in the way of dismissals
that may take place for economic, technical or organisational reasons entailing
changes in the workforce." Id.
55. European Parliament and Council Directive 2002/14/EC of 11 March 2002,
Establishing a General Framework for Informing and Consulting Employees in the
European Community, 2002 O.J. (L 80) 29, available at http://europa.eu.intl
comm/employment-sociallabour_law/docs/directive2002 14_en.pdf [hereinafter
Directive 2002/14IEC].
[Vol. 15:1198
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to prevent "serious decisions affecting employees from being
taken.., without adequate procedures having been imple-
mented beforehand to inform and consult them."56 A related
directive57 addresses the effect inconsistencies in national laws
regarding an employee's notification rights with respect to the
terms of their employment might have on the common market.58
The directive is designed "to provide employees with improved
protection against possible infringements of their rights and to
create greater transparency on the labour market."59 It obli-
gates employers to notify their employees in writing of the
essential aspects of the contract or employment relationship
within two months after the commencement of employment.6 °
56. See id. pmbl. 6. The Directive allows Member States to choose to restrict
the applicability of the Directive to either "undertakings" with at least fifty
employees or "establishments" with more than twenty employees. See id. arts. 2(a),
2(b), 3(1). Motivated by identical concerns, Council Directive 94/45/EC of 22
September 1994, On the Establishment of a European Works Council or a Procedure
in Community-Scale Undertakings and Community-Scale Groups of Undertakings
for the Purposes of Informing and Consulting Employees, 1994 O.J. (L 254) 64,
available at http://europa.eu.intcomm/employment-social/labourlaw/docs/
directive9445 en.pdf [hereinafter Directive 94145/EC], mandates that "employees of
Community-scale undertakings are properly informed and consulted when decisions
which affect them are taken in a Member State other than that in which they are
employed." Id. pmbl. 15. The Directive aims at eliminating unequal treatment of
employees across countries and requires undertakings "to set up European Works
Councils or to create other suitable procedures for the transnational information and
consultation of employees." Id. pmbl. 16; see also id. arts. 1(1), 1(2), 2(1)(a), 2(1)(g).
Additionally, Council Directive 2001/86/EC of 8 October 2001,
Supplementing the Statute for a European Company with Regard to the
Involvement of Employees, 2001 O.J. (L 294) 22, available at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/employmentsocial/labour-law/docs/directive200l 86_en.
pdf [hereinafter Directive 2001i86/EC], sets standards for employee participation in
the affairs of European public limited liability companies, that is, Community-scale
businesses created under Regulation (EC) No 2157/2001. See id. art. 1(1). Finally,
Council Directive 2003/72/EC of 22 July 2003, Supplementing the Statute for a
European Cooperative Society with Regard to the Involvement of Employees, 2003
O.J. (L 207) 25, available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/employment-social/
labour_law/docs/directive200372_en.pdf [hereinafter Directive 2003/72/EC],
establishes the framework for employee participation in the affairs of European
Cooperative Societies. See id. arts. 1(1), 2(a).
57. Council Directive 91/533/EEC of 14 October 1991, On an Employer's
Obligation to Inform Employees of the Conditions Applicable to the Contract or
Employment Relationship, 1991 O.J. (L 288) 32, available at http://europa.eu.intl
commemployment-sociallabour_law/docs/directive9l_533_en.pdf [hereinafter
Directive 911533/EEC].
58. See id. pmbl.
59. See id. pmbl. 6.
60. See id. arts. 2(1), 3(1).
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d. Employee protection in cases of employer insolvency
In this area, EU legislation6 reduces differences in the way
EU countries protect employees when employers become insol-
vent.62 The applicable directive, among other things, mandates
that Member States establish a guarantee institution to assure
payment of outstanding employee claims arising out of employ-
ment contracts or relationships.6 3
e. Working conditions
The EU directive6" dealing with health and safety in
employment requires national legislatures to enact laws which
ensure "that workers with [a temporary or fixed-term] employ-
ment relationship.., are afforded, as regards safety and health
at work, the same level of protection as ... other workers."6'
The directive calls for the creation of accident-preventive
measures, such as the duty to inform workers of job risks66 and
mandatory training tailored to the particular characteristics of
the job.67  A related directive6" mandates that Member States
prohibit work by persons under fifteen years of age.6 ' It further
calls on national legislatures to "ensure that young people are
61. Council Directive 80/987/EEC of 20 October 1980, On the Approximation of
the Laws of the Member States Relating to the Protection of Employees in the Event
of the Insolvency of Their Employer (as amended by Directive 2002/74/EC), 1980
O.J. (L 283) 23, available at http://europa.eu.int/comnemployment-social/
labour law/docs/directive80_- 987 en.pdf [hereinafter Directive 80/987/EEC].
62. See id. pmbl. 5.
63. See id. art. 3(1). The Directive requires that Member States set forth
"detailed rules for the organization, financing, and operation of the guarantee
institutions," including, among other things, that "the assets of the institutions...
be independent of the employers' operating capital and.., inaccessible to
proceedings for insolvency." See id. art. 5.
64. Council Directive 91/383/EEC of 25 June 1991, Supplementing the
Measures to Encourage Improvements in the Safety and Health at Work of Workers
with a Fixed-Duration Employment Relationship or a Temporary Employment
Relationship, 1991 O.J. (L 206) 19, available at http://europa.eu.int/
comm/employment social/ labour law/docs/directive9l_383_en.pdf
[hereinafter Directive 91/383/EEC].
65. See id. art. 2(1).
66. See id. art. 3(1).
67. See id. art. 4.
68. Council Directive 94/33/EC of 22 June 1994, On the Protection of Young
People at Work, 1994 O.J. (L 216) 12, available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/
employment~social/labourlaw/docs/directive94-33_en.pdf [hereinafter Directive
94/33/EC]. The Directive is sourced in the Community Charter of the Fundamental
Social Rights of Workers. See id. pmbl.
69. See id. arts. 3(b), 4(1).
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protected against economic exploitation and against any work
likely to harm their safety, health or physical, mental, moral or
social development or to jeopardize their education.
7 0
Finally, Directive 2003/88/EC on the Organization of
Working Time' "lays down minimum safety and health require-
ments for the organization of working time."72  The Directive
introduces maximum limits on weekly working hours,3 limits on
the duration of periods of night work,74 as well as minimum
requirements for daily, weekly, and annual periods of rest.
7 5
f. Nondiscrimination
The EU's most important employment nondiscrimination
directive 6 aims to create "a level playing-field as regards
equality in employment," and "lay[s] down a general framework
for combating [both direct and indirect] discrimination on the
grounds of religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orien-
tation."77  Similarly, Directive 97/81/EC on Part-Time Work
78
implements the 1997 Framework Agreement reached by
70. See id. art. 1(3). The term "young people" refers to people who are under
eighteen years of age. See id. art. 3(a).
71. European Parliament and Council Directive 2003/88/EC of 4 November
2003, Concerning Certain Aspects of the Organisation of Working Time, 2003 O.J. (L
299) 9, available at http'//europa.eu.int/comm/employment-social/labour-law/docs
directive2003_88_en.pdf [hereinafter Directive 2003/88/EC].
72. See id. art. 1(1).
73. See id. art. 6. The Directive calls on Member States to ensure that "the
average working time for each seven-day period, including overtime, does not exceed
48 hours." See id. art. 6(b) (emphasis added).
74. See id. art. 8. The average normal hours of work for night workers are
capped at eight hours per day. See id. art. 8(a).
75. See id. arts. 3, 5, 7. The Directive commands that workers be afforded a
minimum daily rest period of eleven consecutive hours, a minimum weekly rest
period of twenty-four consecutive hours, and a paid annual leave of at least four
weeks. See id.
76. Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000, Establishing a General
Framework for Equal Treatment in Employment and Occupation, 2000 O.J (L 303)
19, available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/employment-social/labour-law/docs/
directive200078_en.pdf [hereinafter Directive 2000/78/EC].
77. Id. art. 1. Similarly, Council Directive 2000/43/EC, 2000 O.J. (L 180) 22,
available at http:/europa.eu.inteurlex/pri/en/oj/dat/2000/
l180/l18020000719en00220026.pdf, implements the principle of equal treatment
regardless of racial or ethnic origin. See id. pmbl. 1 10.
78. Council Directive 97/81IEC of 15 December 1997, Concerning the
Framework Agreement on Part-Time Work Concluded by UNICE, CEEP and the
ETUC, 1998 O.J. (L 14) 9, available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/employment-
socia]labourlaw/docs/directive97_81_en.pdf [hereinafter Directive 97/81/EC].
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European cross-country organizations.7 9  This agreement sets
forth a "general framework for eliminating discrimination
against part-time workers" and aims at "developing the poten-
tial for part-time work" acceptable to both employers and
workers. ° Correspondingly, Directive 1999/70/EC on Fixed-
Term Work8 1 codifies a 1999 Framework Agreement concluded
by the same organizations, which focuses on the elimination of
discrimination in Member States against workers with fixed-
term contracts and the prevention of "abuse arising from the use
of successive fixed-term employment contracts or relation-
ships." 2
Finally, Directive 96/71/EC on the Posting of Workers83
regulates free movement of persons in the context of trans-
national provision of services and sets forth "mandatory rules
for minimum protection" of temporarily-posted workers to be
observed by host country employers. 4
C. TERTIARY INSTRUMENTS
In addition to secondary instruments, both the European
Commission and the Council set forth nonbinding8 5 recom-
mendations and guidelines primarily designed to channel
national policymaking to achieve broad employment policy
objectives across the EU.86 Tertiary instruments constitute an
indispensable part of the modern European Employment
Strategy, 7 as European institutions strive to achieve the chal-
79. See id. pmbl. 8.
80. Id. pmbl. 1 11, art. 1.
81. Council Directive 1999/70/EC of 28 June 1999, Concerning the Framework
Agreement on Fixed-Term Work Concluded by ETUC, UNICE and CEEP, 1999 O.J.
(L 175) 43, available at http://europa.eu.intcomm/employment-social/labourlaw/
docs/directivel999_70_en.pdf [hereinafter Directive 1999/70/EC].
82. Id. pmbl. 14.
83. European Parliament and Council Directive 96/71/EC of 16 December 1996,
Concerning the Posting of Workers in the Framework of the Provision of Services,
1997 O.J. (L 18) 1, available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/employment-social/
labourlaw/docs/directive96_71 en.pdf [hereinafter Directive 96/71IEC].
84. See id. pmbl. [ 13, art. 2(1).
85. See EU Treaty, supra note 1, art. G(60).
86. See, e.g., Council Recommendation 92/443/EEC of 27 July 1992, Concerning
the Promotion of Participation by Employed Persons in Profits and Enterprise
Results (including equity participation), 1992 O.J. (L 245) 53, available at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/employment-social/labourlaw/docs/recommendation92_4
43-en.pdf (urging Union Members to "ensure that [their] legal structures are
adequate to allow the introduction of [employee] financial participation schemes").
87. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
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lenging goals set forth by the 2000 Lisbon European Council.8
II. CONSISTENCY OF CURRENT ROMANIAN AND
BULGARIAN EMPLOYMENT LEGISLATION WITH THE EU
EMPLOYMENT ACQUIS
The determination whether a specific piece of national legis-
lation complies with the mandates of European Union law is
comprised of two separate inquiries. First, the text of the
national statute in question must be aligned with the text of the
corresponding EU instrument and, unless an exception has been
negotiated, must include all mandatory elements that the
instrument prescribes.s9 Second, and perhaps more import-
antly, national governments are expected to assure that the
amended laws in fact produce effects consistent with the
purposes for which the EU measure was enacted. 90 This second
enquiry is naturally more challenging than the preliminary
textual evaluation, as it demands an examination of enforce-
ment effectiveness of the provisions in question. Little
empirical or other evidence of actual effects of implementing
specific EU legislation exists with regard to Romania and
Bulgaria 9' and this Note therefore focuses mainly on textual
88. The 2000 Lisbon Council set forth a new strategic goal to be achieved by the
EU no later than 2010: "to become the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-
based economy in the world, capable of sustainable economic growth with more and
better jobs and greater social cohesion." See Presidency Conclusions, Lisbon
European Council, supra note 25, para. 5 (emphasis omitted). The guidelines on
how to achieve this challenging goal have become known as the "Lisbon Strategy."
For assessment of the overall progress achieved under the Lisbon Strategy, see
generally High Level Group Chaired by Wim Kok, Facing the Challenge-The
Lisbon Strategy for Growth and Employment (Nov. 2004), http://europa.eu.int'
growthandjobs/pdf/2004-1866-EN-complet.pdf.
89. See generally Communication from the Commission to the Council and the
European Parliament, Roadmaps for Romania and Bulgaria, at 2-3, COM (2002)
624 final (Nov. 13, 2002), available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/docs/
pdf/roadmap-br-ro-2002_en.pdf.
90. See id.
91. See, e.g., Commission of the European Communities, 2004 Regular Report
on Romania's Progress Towards Accession, at 91-96, COM (2004) 657 final (Oct. 6,
2004), available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report_- 2004/pdf/
rrro_2004_en.pdf [hereinafter 2004 Regular Report on Romania]; Commission of
the European Communities, 2004 Regular Report on Bulgaria's Progress Towards
Accession, at 83-88, COM (2004) 657 final (Oct. 6, 2004), available at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report_2004pdf/rrbg_2004_en.pdf
[hereinafter 2004 Regular Report on Bulgaria]; Commission of the European
Communities, 2002 Regular Report on Romania's Progress Towards Accession, at
83-87, COM (2002) 700 final (Oct. 9, 2002), available at http://europa.eu.inttcomm/
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analysis.
A. COLLECTIVE REDUNDANCIES
With respect to collective redundancies, the recently
amended Romanian Labor Code is in full compliance with the
EU's Directive 98/59/EC.92  Provisions of the new Bulgarian
Labor Code, on the other hand, fall short of the directive's man-
date. Most importantly, the Bulgarian statute does not provide
for mandatory notification to public authorities by the
employer,93 an omission that is likely to diminish significantly
the capacity of the Bulgarian government "to seek solutions to
the problems raised by the projected collective redundancies."94
In addition, the definition of a "collective redundancy" in the
Bulgarian code is considerably narrower than that included in
Directive 98/59/EC, which limits the purported broad sweep of
the directive." Finally, the Bulgarian statute deviates from
Directive 98/59/EC with regard to the time at which an
employer becomes obligated to commence consultations withemploee • 96
employee representatives.
enlargement/report2002/ro -en.pdfhttp://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report2002
/ro.en.pdf [hereinafter 2002 Regular Report on Romania]; Commission of the
European Communities, 2002 Regular Report on Bulgaria's Progress Towards
Accession, at 80-83, COM (2002) 700 final (Oct. 9, 2002), available at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report2002/bu-en.pdf [hereinafter 2002
Regular Report on Bulgaria].
92. Compare Rom. Law. No. 53 of 24 Jan. 2003, Off. Gazette of Rom. No. 72 of 5
Feb. 2003, arts. 68-71, available at http://www.mmssf.ro/ejlegislatielaw53.htm
[hereinafter Labor Code of Romania], with Directive 98/59/EC, supra note 46.
93. Compare Bulg. Decree No. 31 of 11 Feb. 1994, Bulg. State Gazette Nos. 26
& 27/1986 (as amended), art. 130(a), available at http://www.mlsp.government.bg
en/docs/labour/Labour%20code%20consolidated%20en.pdf [hereinafter Labor Code of
Bulgaria], with Directive 98/59/EC, supra note 46, arts. 2(3), 3.
94. Directive 98/59/EC, supra note 46, art. 4(2). Participation and oversight by
competent government authorities in the effectuation of collective redundancies is
mandatory under the Directive. See id.
The Bulgarian Code limits the term "collective redundancy" to employee
dismissals caused by the following enumerated occurrences: (1) closing down of the
enterprise; (2) partial closing down of the enterprise or staff cuts; (3) reduction of the
volume of work; and (4) work stoppage for more than fifteen work days. See Labor
Code of Bulgaria, supra note 93, § 1(9), art. 328(1)(1)-(4). Cf. Directive 98/59/EC,
supra note 46, art. l(1)(a) ("'collective redundancies' means dismissals effected by an
employer for one or more reasons not related to the individual workers concerned").
See also id. pmbl. IT 8-9, 11.
96. Compare Labor Code of Bulgaria, supra note 93, art. 130(a)(1) ("In cases
where the employer intends to undertake collective redundancy, he/she shall be
obliged to undertake consultations.... .") (emphasis added), with Directive 98/59/EC,
supra note 46, art. 2(1) ("Where an employer is contemplating collective
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B. TRANSFER OF UNDERTAKINGS
Regarding undertaking transfers, the Romanian code seems
to fall short of satisfying the mandates of Directive 2001/23/EC 9'
in a number of ways. Significantly, the law does not provide for
the protection of employees in the event the relevant transfer
impairs the working conditions of the employees 9s and fails to
specify the procedure to be taken when the entity being trans-
ferred has no employee representatives to be notified.99 In
addition, the Romanian code does not define the term
"transfer,"1° fails to stipulate that the duty to consult employee
representatives applies irrespective of whether the transfer is
undertaken by the employer or "an undertaking controlling the• 102
employer,"'' and omits several notice requirements.
The Bulgarian Labor Code suffers from many of the same
deficiencies-it fails to provide for employee "dismissals" caused
by deteriorated working conditions' and for transfers under-
taken by the employer's parent company.' Interestingly, the
redundancies, he shall begin consultations.... .") (emphasis added).
97. See supra note 50.
98. Compare Labor Code of Romania, supra note 92, arts. 169-70, with
Directive 2001/23/EC, supra note 50, art. 4(2).
99. Directive 2001/23/EC, supra note 50, art. 4(2). Compare Labor Code of
Romania, supra note 92, art. 170, with Directive 2001/23/EC, supra note 50, art.
7(6). See also infra note 102.
100. Compare Directive 2001/23/EC, supra note 50, art. 1(b), with Labor Code of
Romania, supra note 92, art. 169. Such transparency deficit can undoubtedly cause
considerable ambiguity that may, for example, substantially increase the
transaction costs of effecting layoffs, reduce the efficacy of public oversight, as well
as severely diminish the amount of effective protection Directive 2001/23/EC intends
to bestow on employees. See also supra note 18 and accompanying text.
101. Directive 2001/23/EC, supra note 50, art. 7(4). Compare id. with Labor
Code of Romania, supra note 92, art. 169(1).
102. Compare, eg., Directive 2001J23/EC, supra note 50, art. 7(1) ("The
transferor and transferee shall be required to inform the representatives of their...
employees.., of the following: [1] the date or proposed date of the transfer, [21 the
reasons for the transfer, [3] the legal, economic and social implications of the
transfer for the employees, [4] any measures envisaged in relation to the
employees .... The transferee must give such information to the representatives of
his employees in good time, and in any event before his employees are directly
affected by the transfer as regards their conditions of work and employment."), with
Labor Code of Romania, supra note 92, art. 170 ("The transferer and the transferee
must inform and consult, prior to the transfer, the trade union or, as the case may
be, the employees' representatives as regards the legal, economic, and social
consequences for the employees deriving from the transfer of the property right.").
103. See Directive 2001/23/EC, supra note 50, art. 4(2); cf. Labor Code of
Bulgaria, supra note 93, art. 123(1).
104. See Directive 2001/23/EC, supra note 50, art. 7(4); cf. Labor Code of
Bulgaria, supra note 93, art. 123(1).
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law prohibits outright most post-transfer employee dismissals °5
and allows the parties to the transaction to agree as to who will
remain responsible for obligations to the company's em-
ployees. Both provisions are inconsistent with Directive
2001/23/EC. °7 Finally, Bulgarian legislators, by enumerating a
limited set of discrete transactions to which protection applies,
narrowed-perhaps inadvertently-the intended broad scope of
Directive 2001/23/EC.10 8
C. RIGHTS OF INFORMATION
The Romanian labor laws are in compliance with Directive
2002/14/EC'09 with respect to all mandatory elements regarding
an employee's right of information but for the protection of confi-
dential information."0 The Bulgarian statute on the other hand,
105. See Labor Code of Bulgaria, supra note 93, art. 123(1) ("The employment
relationship with the employee shall not be terminated. .. ." (emphasis added)); cf.
Directive 2001/23/EC, supra note 50, art. 4(1) ("The transfer... shall not in itself
constitute grounds for dismissal by the transferor or the transferee. This provision
shall not stand in the way of dismissals that may take place for economic, technical
or organisational reasons entailing changes in the workforce." (emphasis added)).
106. See Labor Code of Bulgaria, supra note 93, art. 123(3) ("Unless otherwise
agreed between the two employers, liable for the obligations to the employee.., shall
be. ... " (emphasis added)); cf. Directive 2001/23/EC, supra note 50, art. 3(1) ("The
transferor's rights and obligations ... shall . . . be transferred to the transferee."
(emphasis added)).
107. The two provisions nevertheless seem to be consistent with the underlying
purpose of the Directive-i.e., employee protection. See supra text accompanying
note 51. But see Directive 2001I23/EC, supra note 50, art. 8.
108. Compare Directive 2001123/EC, supra note 50, art. 1(b) ("There is a transfer
within the meaning of [Directive 2001/23/EC] where there is a transfer of an
economic entity which retains its identity, meaning an organised grouping of
resources which has the objective of pursuing an economic activity, whether or not
that activity is central or ancillary."), with Labor Code of Bulgaria, which states:
The employment relationship with the employee shall not be terminated: 1.
in case of merger of enterprises; 2. in case of joining of one enterprise with
another; 3. in case of distribution of the operations of one enterprise
between several enterprises; 4. in case of transfer of an autonomous part of
one enterprise to another; 5. in the event of change of the owner of the
enterprise or of an autonomous part thereof; 6. in the case of delivery of the
enterprise or an autonomous part thereof for rent, on lease or under
concession.
Labor Code of Bulgaria, supra note 93, art. 123(1).
109. See Directive 2002/14/EC, supra note 55. Directive 2002/14/EC provides a
general framework for informing and consulting employees in the EU. See id.
110. See id. art. 6 ("Member States shall provide that... employees'
representatives, and any experts who assist them, are not authorised to reveal...
any information which, in the legitimate interest of the undertaking or
establishment, has expressly been provided to them in confidence." (emphasis
[Vol. 15:1
2006] STRATEGIES FOR ROMANIA AND BULGARIA
fails to satisfy the directive's mandates in a number of ways.
First, the duty to inform and consult provided for by the law is
much narrower than that prescribed by the directive."' Second,
the statute fails to provide for the protection of employee
representatives carrying out their functions." 2 Finally, as in
Romania, Bulgarian legislators failed to satisfy the directive
with respect to protection of confidential information." '3
With regard to informing employees of essential aspects of
their employment contract, the Romanian code is in full compli-
ance with Directive 91/533/EEC."4  This is in contrast to the
Bulgarian statute, which contains a number of deficiencies
related to, among other things, content of the mandatory dis-
closure, protection of expatriate employees, and modification of
the employment contract."'
added)). Compare Directive 2002/141EC, supra note 55, with Labor Code of
Romania, supra note 92, arts. 37, 42, 52, 221(2).
111. Directive 2002/14/EC states:
Information and consultation shall cover: (a) information on the recent and
probable development of the undertaking's or the establishment's activities
and economic situation; (b) information and consultation on the situation,
structure and probable development of employment within the undertaking
or establishment and on any anticipatory measures envisaged, in
particular where there is a threat to employment; (c) information and
consultation on decisions likely to lead to substantial changes in work
organisation or in contractual relations, including those covered by the
Community provisions referred to in Article 9(1).
Directive 2002/14/EC, supra note 55, art. 4(2). Compare Directive 2002/14/EC,
supra note 55, art. 4(2), with Labor Code of Bulgaria, supra note 93, art. 130(1)
("The employees shall be entitled to timely, authentic and understandable
information about the economic and financial position of the employer, such as may
be important for their employment rights and obligations.").
112. See Directive 2002/141EC, supra note 55, art. 7.
113. Unlike the Romanian Code, the Bulgarian statute does contain a provision
dealing with the right of an employer to refuse, under certain circumstances, to
provide pertinent information to employee representatives. This right, however, is
more constricted than that provided by Directive 2002/141EC. Compare id. art. 6
("Member States shall provide that .. employees' representatives ... are not
authorised to reveal.., any information which, in the legitimate interest of the
undertaking or establishment, has expressly been provided to them in confidence."
(emphasis added)), with Labor Code of Bulgaria, supra note 93, art. 52(1)(2)(b)
("[P]rovision of information the disclosure of which could cause damages to the
employer may be... granted subject to requirement for confidentiality." (emphasis
added)).
114. Compare Labor Code of Romania, supra note 92, arts. 16-19, with Directive
91/533/EEC, supra note 57, arts. 2-5, 8.
115. Compare Labor Code of Bulgaria, supra note 93, arts. 62, 66(1), 127(4)-(5),
with Directive 911533/EEC, supra note 57, arts. 2(2)(e)-(f), 4-5.
MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT'L LAW
D. EMPLOYEE PROTECTION IN CASES OF EMPLOYER INSOLVENCY,
WORKING CONDITIONS, AND NONDISCRIMINATION
The Romanian Labor Code is in full compliance with all pro-
visions of the EU Directive on Employer Insolvency,"' as well as
all of the relevant directives on working conditions-the
Directive on Health and Safety,117 the Directive on Young
People," 8 and the Directive on Working Conditions."9 As for
nondiscrimination, Romania's statute is consistent with three of
the four EU directives aimed at eliminating labor market dis-
crimination-the Directive on Equal Treatment, 2 ° the Directive
on Part-time Work,'21 and the Directive on Fixed-term Work
122
but fails to provide for the protection of temporarily-posted
workers.
2 3
The Bulgarian Labor Code, on the other hand, does not con-
tain any provisions regarding employee protection in the event
of employer insolvency and therefore does not presently satisfy
Directive 80/987/EEC. 24 Bulgaria, however, is in full compli-
ance with all three relevant EU directives on working
conditions, 12 as well as all four directives on nondiscrimi-nation. 26
116. Compare Labor Code of Romania, supra note 92, arts. 167-68, with
Directive 80/987/EEC, supra note 61, arts. 3, 5.
117. Compare Directive 91/383/EEC, supra note 64, with Labor Code of
Romania, supra note 92, arts. 6(1), 27-28, 171-87, 258(a).
118. Compare Directive 94133/EC, supra note 68, with Labor Code of Romania,
supra note 92, arts. 13, 109(2), 125(1) 130(2).
119. Compare Directive 2003/88/EC, supra note 71, with Labor Code of
Romania, supra note 92, arts. 39(1)(b)-(c), 108-24, 130-33, 139-48.
120. Compare Directive 2000/78/EC, supra note 76, with Labor Code of
Romania, supra note 92, arts. 59(a), 154(3).
121. Compare Directive 97/81/EC, supra note 78, with Labor Code of Romania,
supra note 92, arts. 91, 100, 103, 128.
122. Compare Directive 1999/70/EC, supra note 81, with Labor Code of
Romania, supra note 92, arts. 80(3), 82(1), 128.
123. The Romanian Labor Code does not contain any provision specifically
providing for the protection of temporarily-posted workers. See Labor Code of
Romania, supra note 92.
124. Compare Labor Code of Bulgaria, supra note 93, with Directive
80/987/EEC, supra note 61.
125. Compare Directive 91/383/EEC, supra note 64, with Labor Code of
Bulgaria, supra note 93, arts. 275, 277, 281-90; compare Directive 94/33/EC, supra
note 68, with Labor Code of Bulgaria, supra note 93, arts. 137(1)(2), 147(1)(1);
compare Directive 2003/88/EC, supra note 71, with Labor Code of Bulgaria, supra
note 93, arts. 136-37, 140-41, 143-53, 155-56, 261-62.
126. Compare Directive 2000/78/EC, supra note 76, with Labor Code of Bulgaria,
supra note 93, art. 8(3); compare Directive 97/81JEC, supra note 78, with Labor Code
of Bulgaria, supra note 93, art. 138; compare Directive 1999/70/EC, supra note 81,
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In sum, the Romanian and Bulgarian labor codes currently
in force both fail to satisfy the demands of numerous EU direc-
tives dealing with employment issues. The two countries' non-
compliance with applicable EU legislation could potentially have
an adverse effect on the speed of their integration into the
European Union.2 1 In addition, Romania and Bulgaria run the
risk that if they are accepted into the Union despite their labor
codes' nonconformity, their legislation could be attacked by
parties injured by such nonconformity or by EU bodies before
the ECJ.12s More significantly, the two countries could be sub-. • • 129
ject to significant monetary sanctions.
III. STRATEGIES
Central and Eastern European transition economies have
received a significant amount of attention by economic resear-
chers in the past decade as an ideal place both to test esta-
blished economic theories 3 ° and to analyze the less-explored
mechanics of economic transition. 3' This research has provided
with Labor Code of Bulgaria, supra note 93, arts. 68, 70; compare Directive
96/7IJEC, supra note 83, with Labor Code of Bulgaria, supra note 93, arts. 10(1), 11.
127. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
128. See, e.g., Case C-117/01, K.B. Nat'l Health Serv. Pensions Agency and Sec'y
of State for Health, 2004 E.C.R. 00541, available at http://europa.eu.int/smartapi/
cgi/sga doc?smartapi!celexapi!prod!CELEXnumdoc&lg=EN&numdoc=62001J0117&
model=guichett; Case C-55/02, Comm'n of the Eur. Communities v. Portuguese
Republic, 2004 E.C.R. 1-00541, available at httpJ/europa.eu.int/smartapi/cgi/
sga.doc?smartapi!celexapi!prod!CELEXnumdoc&lg=EN&numdoc=62002J0055&mo
del=guichett.
129. See, e.g., Budget Sanctions Hit Germany and France (BBC radio broadcast
Nov. 19, 2002), available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hifbusiness/2492339.stm.
130. See, e.g., Jan Hanousek & Zdenek Tuma, A Test of the Permanent Market
Hypothesis on Czech Voucher Privatisation (William Davidson Inst., Working Paper
No. 75, 1997), available at http://www.bus.umich.edu/KresgeLibrary/Collections/
WorkingPapers/wdi/wp75.pdf.
131. See, e.g., Manuela Angelucci et al., The Effect of Ownership and Competitive
Pressure on Firm Performance in Transition Countries: Micro Evidence from
Bulgaria, Romania and Poland (William Davidson Inst., Working Paper No. 434,
2002), available at http://www.bus.umich.edu/KresgeLibrary/Collections/
WorkingPapers/wdi/wp434.pdf; Daniel Daianu & Radu Vranceanu, Subduing High
Inflation in Romania: How to Better Monetary and Exchange Rate Mechanisms?
(William Davidson Inst., Working Paper No. 402, 2001), available at
http://www.bus.umich.edu/KresgeLibrary/CollectionsfWorkingPapers/wdi/
wp402.pdf, Claire Wallace, Work Flexibility in Eight European Countries: A Cross-
national Comparison, in SOCIOLOGICAL SERIES 60 INST. FOR ADVANCED STUDIES
(2003), available at http://www.ihs.ac.at/publications/soc/rs60.pdf; Alexandru Voicu,
Labor Force Participation Dynamics in the Romanian Labor Market (William
Davidson Inst., Working Paper No. 481, 2002), available at
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a number of valuable insights about the path from Marx to
market, insights which can be utilized by other countries that
have started transforming their economies later in time or that
will do so in the future. Romania and Bulgaria are noted to be
two of the late-starters in the process of economic transition,
and this was undoubtedly one of the primary reasons for their
nonacceptance by the EU in May 2004, along with eight fellow
countries from the former Soviet bloc.
33
Nevertheless, this tardiness gives Romania and Bulgaria
the benefit of being able to learn from the transformation exper-
iences of the newly-acceded EU countries and thus avoid at least
some of the common mistakes that have had a variety of nega-
tive economic and social effects.14 While the national political,
economic, and social contexts naturally differ to a certain extent
across the CEE region, the level of homogeneity nonetheless is
sufficient to allow Romania and Bulgaria to extract a number of
valuable lessons, enabling them more easily to achieve the ulti-
mate goal of their economic and political transformation:
convergence with the West.
35
With respect to employment law and policy, the lessons that
can be learned span a number of topics, ranging from the proper
structure of labor market institutions to the effects of privati-
zation on labor market flexibility. Importantly, many of the
relevant transition economists' insights about labor market
dynamics in the CEE region can be used successfully while at
the same time remaining faithful to both the text and purpose of
the applicable EU employment acquis
3 6
A. LOWERING UNEMPLOYMENT
Like other post-communist economies, since the early 1990s
Romania and Bulgaria have experienced an until-then unknown
http://www.bus.umich.edu/
KresgeLibrary/Collections/WorkingPapers/wdi/wp481.pdf.
132. This is particularly so with regard to countries of the CEE region whose
geopolitical, socioeconomic, and cultural backgrounds are to a large extent similar.
133. See supra discussion accompanying note 13; see also 2004 Regular Report
on Romania, supra note 91; 2004 Regular Report on Bulgaria, supra note 91; 2002
Regular Report on Romania, supra note 91; 2002 Regular Report on Bulgaria, supra
note 91.
134. See, eg., Daianu & Vranceanu, supra note 131, at 3-4 (discussing inflation
in early transition).
135. See generally Estrin & Urga, supra note 20.
136. See supra Part I.
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phenomenon: non-zero unemployment.'8 7  Particularly in
Bulgaria, economic restructuring during this period has brought
about a persistently high level of unemployment, which, among
other negative effects, burdens its newly-created unemployment
insurance and welfare schemes." 8 High unemployment has also
been found to have a negative impact on the speed of transition;
for example, by making it much harder for policymakers to
139implement further pro-market transformation measures.
Research on unemployment in CEE transition economies offers
a number of tools that can be used by Romania and Bulgaria to
help lower their unemployment levels and keep them low.
1. Tightening Unemployment Benefits
A number of researchers studying CEE transition econo-
mies have found that higher unemployment benefits lead to an
increase in unemployment in these countries. 4 ° Conversely,
economists have discovered that tightening of unemployment
benefits-that is, reducing the amounts or duration of unem-
ployment insurance transfers-during a period of rising unemp-
loyment has the negative effect of pushing the unemployed
towards nonparticipation in the labor force rather than towards
137. See Tito Boeri, What Can We Learn from the Experiences of Transitional
Economies with Labor Market Policies 2 (William Davidson Inst., Working Paper No.
62, 1997), available at http://www.bus.umich.edu/KresgeLibrary/Collections/
WorkingPapers/wdi/wp62.pdf.
138. Eurostat data indicates that unemployment in Bulgaria has remained
above fifteen percent for most of the past five years but has begun to decline
recently. Romanian unemployment, on the other hand, has remained relatively low
by European standards, oscillating around seven percent in the past five years.
Total Employment Rate, EUROSTAT (2004), http://europa.eu.int/comm/eurostatl
[hereinafter EUROSTATI.
139. See, e.g., Philippe Aghion & Olivier Blanchard, On the Speed of Transition
in Central Europe, in 9 NBER MACROECON. ANN. 283 (Stanley Fisher & Julio J.
Rotemberg eds., 1994) (arguing that when the emerging private sector fails to absorb
jobs being lost in the restructuring of the public sector, the resulting rise in
unemployment slows down the speed of further transformation as political
consensus shifts against pro-market reforms); see also Valentijin Bilsen & Jozef
Konings, Job Creation, Job Destruction, and Growth of Newly Established,
Privatized, and State-Owned Enterprises in Transition Economies: Survey Evidence
from Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, 26 J. COMP. ECON. 429, 429-44 (1998).
140. See, e.g., Aghion & Blanchard, supra note 139; Michael Burda et al.,
Unemployment, Labor Markets and Structural Change in Eastern Europe, 16 ECON.
POLVY 102, 102-37 (1993); Pietro Garibaldi & Zuzana Brixiova, Labor Market
Institutions and Unemployment Dynamics in Transition Economies (Int'l Monetary
Fund, Working Paper No. 97/ 137, 1997), available at http'//www.imf.org/external/
pubs/ftwp/wp97137.pdf.
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employment.14 Correspondingly, the Czech Republic's re-
duction in unemployment benefits in the first half of the 1990s
has been viewed as a success by economists due to, inter alia,
the fact that the reforms were put into place at a time when the
country's unemployment was still relatively low and did not
therefore have the negative effect of driving a significant
number of unemployed workers from unemployment insurance
toward nonparticipation.
1 2
These findings are of current relevance to both Romania
and Bulgaria. In Bulgaria, the number of the long-term un-
employed has been decreasing since 2002." This indicates that
the cost savings associated with potential tightening of
unemployment insurance benefits would not be offset by a signi-
ficant cost increase brought about by workers giving up their
search for work and falling back towards the welfare rolls.
Similarly, given the experiences of the Czech Republic in
the early 1990s,"4 Romania would also seemingly benefit from
decreasing the amount of unemployment transfers, as the
country has relatively low total unemployment,4 and at the
same time, its long-term unemployment has remained more or
less constant over the past five years."6 It should be empha-
sized, however, that the benefits brought about by the lowering
of unemployment benefits-most importantly, budget savings
and higher employment-are more likely to be achieved through
a concomitant expansion and better effectiveness of government
employment programs."'
141. See, e.g., Marek G6ra & Christoph M. Schmidt, Long-Term Unemployment,
Unemployment Benefits and Social Assistance: The Polish Assistance (William
Davidson Inst., Working Paper No. 110, 1997), available at
http://www.bus.umich.edu/KresgeLibrary/Collections/WorkingPapers/wdi/wpll0.pdf
(arguing for the payment of unemployment benefits to the long-term unemployed to
foster employment growth).
142. See Boeri, supra note 137, at 11 ("ITihe pace of growth of unemployment
prior to [the labor market] reforms was not lower in the Czech Republic than in
other central and eastern European countries and active policies have had
significant and strong net effect on outflows to jobs.... " (emphasis added)).
143. EUROSTAT, supra note 138. The number of long-term unemployed in
Bulgaria fell by more than 100,000 persons (out of approximately 3.3 million
economically active persons) between 2002 and 2003 alone. See id.
144. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
145. See supra note 138.
146. Since the second quarter of 2002, the rate of the long-term (twelve months
or more) unemployed to the total number of unemployed persons has been
oscillating between fifty-five and sixty-five percent. See EUROSTAT, supra note 138.
147. See Boeri, supra note 137, at 11 (discussing the relationship between Czech
Republic's low unemployment in the mid-1990s and the design of its government
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2. Attenuating the Tripartite Structure of Government
Employment Agency Decision-Making
As noted by economists, a tripartite structure of govern-
ment employment services-a structure in which the employees'
and employers' representatives are heavily involved in the day-
to-day operations of employment agencies along with the
government-has a negative impact on both efficiency and
effectiveness of such services. 4 " Employment agencies in
Romania and Bulgaria therefore would benefit from attenuating
burdensome tripartism, a presently standard feature of employ-
ment agency decision-making in the CEE region. 149This
particularly true at the local level, where agencies have been
found to be most effective when they keep their focus on provi-
ding client-oriented services.50
3. Regional Cooperation Among Employment Agencies and
Proper Targeting
Similar to other countries in Central and Eastern Europe,
Romanian and Bulgarian unemployment varies substantially
across regions. High unemployment is characteristic parti-
cularly for regions whose industries have undergone deep
restructuring or where large-scale privatization projects have
failed, with unemployment being the lowest in large cities.
The two countries undoubtedly would profit from closer inter-
regional cooperation among government employment agencies,
the development of a national online job database, and greater
support of interregional worker relocation. 3
employment programs).
148. See id. at 5 (noting that substantial involvement of the social partners
slows down the decision-making process and thus decreases efficiency).
149. Id. See also Labor Code of Romania, supra note 92, arts. 214-35; Labor
Code of Bulgaria, supra note 93, arts. 2, 3(a)-(f).
150. See Boeri, supra note 137, at 11 (arguing that "a strongly decentralized and
client-oriented administration [of government employment agencies] is not at odds
with the pursuit of policies promoting the regional mobility of workers").
151. EUROSTAT, supra note 138.
152. Id.
153. The two countries could, at least in part, finance these new tools through
assistance funds provided by the EU's Phare program (along with funds from the
ISPA and SAPARD programs). The Phare program is one of the pre-accession
devices financed by the EU to assist the applicant countries of Central and Eastern
Europe in their preparations for joining the European Union. The purported uses of
the Phare funds include, inter alia, market institution building and financing of
measures aimed at strengthening economic and social cohesion in the applicant
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In addition, the experiences of Hungary, Poland, and the
Czech Republic from the mid-1990s underscore the importance
of proper targeting of active government employment programs,
such as the training and retraining of unemployed workers. In
particular, these programs should include measures to prevent
participation by workers with favorable labor market charac-
teristics, i.e., those who would likely have found a job even
154 wlwithout partaking in the government programs, as well as
measures which would assure that the participation in the
training programs does not in fact decrease the probability of
subsequent employment.
15
4. Adequate Staffing of Government Employment Agencies and
Development of Private Placement Agency Networks
Available data indicates that both Romanian and Bulgarian
government employment agencies suffer from inadequate
staffing (measured by labor force per staff), as well as insuffi-
cient staff training.156 These two factors, while understandable
from an historical perspective, clearly have a negative effect on
a person's ability to find work and have a tendency to increase
countries. See, e.g., Council Regulation 3906/89, 1989 O.J. (L 375) 11 (EC), available
at http://europa.eu.int/smartapi/cgi/sga-doc?smartapi!celexplus!prod!DocNumber&
lg=en&type-doc=Regulation&an-doc=1989&nu doc=3906; see also European
Commission, Enlargement Directorate-General, Enlargement of the European
Union-An Historic Opportunity 16-23 (2003), http://europa.eu.int/comm/
enlargement/docs/pdf/historic-opportunity_2003_en.pdf [hereinafter European
Commission, Enlargement of the European Union].
154. See, e.g., J. Micklewright & G. Nagy, Flows to and from Insured
Unemployment in Hungary (European Univ. Instit., Working Paper No. 94/41, 1994)
(finding that, in Hungary, many slots in training and retraining programs are filled
with workers with favorable labor-market characteristics), cited in Tito Boeri, What
Can We Learn from the Experiences of Transitional Economies with Labor Market
Policies 2 (William Davidson Inst., Working Paper No. 62, 1997), available at
http://www.bus.umich.edu/KresgeLibrary/Collections/WorkingPaperswdi/wp62.pdf..
155. Patrick A. Puhani & Viktor Steiner, Public Works for Poland? Active
Labour Market Policies during Transition (Zentrum ftir Europaische
Wirtschaftsforschung Discussion Paper, Paper No. 96-01, 1996). The developments
in the Czech Republic in the mid-1990s indicate that government-subsidized
employment can be used as one of the tools to mitigate the negative-signaling
problem brought about by worker participation in government training and
retraining programs. See Boeri, supra note 137, at 4.
156. In Romania, the labor force per staff ratio was approximately 10 times
higher than in the UK as of 1993. In Bulgaria, it was approximately 2.5 times
higher. Both countries' labor force per staff ratio was likewise significantly higher
than that observed in other Western European countries-Denmark, Norway, and
Sweden-as well as in fellow CEE transformation economies. See Boeri, supra note
137, at 3-4.
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the outflow from unemployment to nonparticipation (welfare) as
more people are discouraged from cooperating with public
employment agencies which in turn decreases their chance of
finding a job.'57 It would therefore be well-advised for the two
countries to invest in a more effective employment agency infra-
structure. Efforts should be channeled, inter alia, towards
better financing and expansion of existing government pro-
grams-using Western European staffing ratios and staff
training requirements as a benchmark-as well as towards the
development of a framework for the creation of private sector
employment agency networks."'
B. PRIVATIZATION AND SUPPORT FOR SMALL AND MEDIUM-SIZED
BUSINESSES
A number of recent studies analyzing the simultaneous
creation and destruction of job opportunities in transforming
CEE economies have shown that both "state-owned and priva-
tized firms destroy a significant number of jobs [in these
economies].""' These same studies have discovered, however,
that the privatized firms have been more successful than state-
owned companies in simultaneously creating new job oppor-
tunities.160 Further, the largest capacity for the creation of new
jobs has been found among private companies founded after the
fall of the Iron Curtain. 6 ' Additionally, the presence of private
companies, both privatized and private from inception, has been
shown to be positively related to FDI inflow, work productivity,
and job satisfaction.'
157. The notion that agency understaffing has a negative effect on people's
ability to find employment is supported by evidence that, as between Romania and
Bulgaria on one side, and the UK (along with other Western European countries) on
the other, the differential in the placement per staff ratio as between the two groups
is significantly lower that the differential in the labor force per staff ratio. See id.
158. For staffing ratios of Denmark, Sweden, Norway, and the UK, see id.
159. Ralitza Dimova, The Impact of Structural Reforms on Employment Growth
and Labour Productivity: Evidence from Bulgaria and Romania 4 (William Davidson
Inst., Working Paper No. 600, 2003), available at http://wdi.umich.edu/files/
Publications/WorkingPapers/wp600.pdf.
160. See id.
161. See id. (also noting that small firms have a greater job-producing capacity
than large firms in transition economies).
162. See, e.g., Jozef Konings, Firm Performance in Bulgaria and Estonia: The
Effects of Competitive Pressure, Financial Pressure and Disorganization (William
Davidson Inst., Working Paper No. 185, 1998), available at http://
www.bus.umich.edu/KresgeLibrary/Collections/WorkingPapers/wdi/wpl85.pdf;
Robert A. Roe et al., Firm Ownership and Work Motivation in Bulgaria and
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Given these findings, as well as the strong growth potential
of private sector firms in the two countries,"3 Romania and
Bulgaria would indeed benefit from developing a legal and insti-
tutional framework conducive to the creation of small and
medium-sized businesses, speeding up existing privatization
projects, as well as from taking other measures aimed at
enhancing competitiveness and FDI inflow.
6 4
C. MACROSTABILIZATION
Macroeconomic stability is one of the three prerequisites for
accession to the European Union.'65 From a macroeconomic per-
spective, Romania and Bulgaria must solve two major problems
before they can hope to achieve their transformation goals and
successfully converge with countries of the European Union.
First, both countries should bring inflation down radically, as
close to one-digit levels as possible. 6 6 The second problem for
the two economies is their record of meager growth. Both
Romania and Bulgaria have significantly underperformed their
CEE counterparts in the last ten years, 6 7 which was
undoubtedly one of the primary reasons for their nonacceptance
into the EU in May 2004.168
D. EXPLOITING THE INTRICACIES OF EU ACCESSION
NEGOTIATIONS
One potential way to avoid or mitigate the probable political
backlash' 69 stemming from unpopular employment policy
Hungary: An Empirical Study of the Transition in the Mid-1990s
(William Davidson Inst., Working Paper No. 205, 1998), available at http:l!
www.bus.umich.edu/KresgeLibrary/Collections/WorkingPapers/wdi/wp205.pdf.
163. See, eg., Angelucci et al., supra note 131.
164. See, eg., John S. Earle, Industrial Decline and Labor Reallocation in
Romania (William Davidson Inst., Working Paper No. 118, 1997), available at
http://www.bus.umich.edu/KresgeLibrary/Collections/WorkingPapers/wdi/wp118.pdf
(discussing the importance of educational attainment); see also Bhaumik, Estrin &
Meyer, supra note 19 (discussing the importance of Foreign Direct Investment).
165. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
166. Both countries have been battling two-digit inflation for an extended period
of time. Romania, for example, had inflation higher than fifty percent in 1999. See
EUROSTAT, supra note 138.
167. See generally Daianu & Vranceanu, supra note 131.
168. See, e.g., European Policy Committee, The Structural Challenges Facing the
Candidate Countries (Bulgaria, Romania, Turkey)--A Comparative Perspective,
EPC/ECFIN/225/2004 final (Aug. 6, 2004), available at http://europa.eu.intcomm/
economy-finance/epc/documents/2004/candidate countriesfinal-en.pdf.
169. See, e.g., Aghion & Blanchard, supra note 139.
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reforms, such as reductions in the amount or duration of
unemployment benefits, might lie in the institutional inter-
action between national policymakers and EU bodies.17° More
specifically, the broad requirements of the Copenhagen
criteria171 might be used by national legislators as a shield
against negative reactions of domestic constituencies, and
detested yet beneficial reforms could thus be implemented with-
out losing a significant amount of domestic political support.
Given that the backing for accession to the EU has been persis-
tently high in all countries of the CEE region..2 and that the
constituencies in these countries are generally unfamiliar with
the specific requirements and mechanics of EU accession as well
as with the EU itself,173 skillful political maneuvering seems to
be one of the tools of choice for domestic politicians in Romania
and Bulgaria who desire to introduce both long-term and short-
term economic reforms.
CONCLUSION
Although the two countries are at present expected to be
allowed to accede to the European Union in 2007,174 further
170. See, e.g., European Commission, Enlargement of the European Union, supra
note 153, at 10-29 (discussing the rudimentary mechanics of this institutional
interaction at the pre-accession stage).
171. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
172. The relationship between the acceding countries of Central and Eastern
Europe and the EU has been described by some as being one of convenience, not
love-i.e., while many citizens in acceding countries fear, inter alia, "unaccountable"
Brussels' bureaucrats and the loss of national sovereignty, accession to the
European Union is seen by the vast majority as a practical necessity. See, e.g.,
Vaclav Klaus, Czech Republic and the EU: The Marriage of Convenience, Not of Love,
Sept. 11, 2004, http://www.klaus.cz/klaus2lasp/clanek.asp?id=CIIjrk437LAg; see
generally OPTEM S.A.R.L., Perceptions of the European Union: Study for the
European Commission (2001), http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/governance/areas/
studies/optem-reporten.pdf [hereinafter OPTEM]. Accordingly, in the past few
years, the popular support for EU accession in both Bulgaria and Romania has been
steadily oscillating around eighty percent. See, e.g., Over Three Fourths of
Romanians Would Vote for Country's Accession to the EU, MEDIAFAX (Jul. 16, 2002),
http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargementopinion/imasonromania.pdf; EUROPEAN
UNION & BBSS GALLUP INTERNATIONAL, Bulgarian Public Attitudes Towards EU
Accession (2002), http'//europa.eu.int/comm/ enlargement/opinion/
bulgarianpublicattitudes towards eu accession.pdf.
173. See, e.g., OPTEM, supra note 172.
174. See, e.g., EU Backs Bulgaria and Romania Bid (BBC radio broadcast Apr.
13, 2005), available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4440755.stm; EU
Candidates Sign Entry Treaty (BBC radio broadcast Apr. 25, 2005), available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4480677.stm; see also supra notes 12-13.
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improvements need to be made before Romania and Bulgaria
will be in compliance with all three accession requirements set
forth by the 1993 Copenhagen European Council.175  The
analysis has shown that the current labor legislation of both
countries falls short of satisfying the third of the Copenhagen
criteria-mandatory incorporation of the EU's acquis
communautaire. 176 Moreover, there are a number of valuable
transformation lessons that can be learned from the experiences
of the eight CEE countries that entered the EU in May 2004;
lessons which, if used, could aid Romania and Bulgaria in satis-
fying the second of the Copenhagen criteria-the requirement of
a functioning market economy.
175. See supra discussion accompanying note 9.
176. See id.
177. See id.
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